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Abstract
We study private quantum channels on a single qubit, which encrypt
given set of plaintext states P. Specifically, we determine all achievable
states ρ(0) (average output of encryption) and for each particular set P
we determine the entropy of the key necessary and sufficient to encrypt
this set. It turns out that single bit of key is sufficient when the set P is
two dimensional. However, the necessary and sufficient entropy of the key
in case of three dimensional P varies continuously between 1 and 2 bits
depending on the state ρ(0). Finally, we derive private quantum channels
achieving these bounds. We show that the impossibility of universal NOT
operation on qubit can be derived from the fact that one bit of key is not
sufficient to encrypt qubit.
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography [14, 5] (for a popular review see [16]) is a rapidly de-
veloping branch of quantum information processing. The results of quantum
cryptography include quantum key distribution [3, 12], quantum secret sharing
[19, 9], quantum oblivious transfer [4, 10] and other cryptographic protocols [17].
Quantum cryptography has two main goals: solutions to classical cryptographic
primitives, and quantum cryptographic primitives.
The first goal is to design solutions of cryptographic primitives, which achieve
a higher (provable) degree of security than their classical counterparts. The
degree of security should be better than the security of any known classical
solution, or it should be of the degree that is even not achievable by using
1
classical information theory at all. Another alternative is to design a solution
which is more efficient1 than any classical solution of comparable security.
The second class of cryptosystems is motivated by the evolution of appli-
cations of quantum information processing, regardless whether their purpose is
cryptographic, communication complexity based or algorithmic. These cryp-
tosystems are designed to manipulate quantum information. As applications of
quantum information processing start to challenge a number of their classical
counterparts, the need to secure quantum communications in general is get-
ting more urgent. Therefore, there is a large class of quantum primitives which
should secure quantum communication in the same way as classical communi-
cation is secured. These primitives include encryption of quantum information
using both classical [1, 6, 23] and quantum key [21], authentication of quantum
information [2], secret sharing of quantum information [9, 15], quantum data
hiding [11] and even commitment to a quantum bit [5], oblivious transfer of
quantum information [5] and others.
In this paper we concentrate on the encryption of quantum information with
classical key [1] described and explained in Section 2. At the end of Section 2
we introduce notation and one theorem we will be using through the remaining
sections. To begin our analysis, in Section 3 we investigate for a given set P the
set of all possible states ρ(0) such that there exists a private quantum channel
Eˆ with the property ∀ρ ∈ P : Eˆ(ρ) = ρ(0) and we determine that it forms a
ball within the Bloch sphere centered in 121 . In the Sections 4–7 we derive all
possible private quantum channels for a given set P and state ρ(0) and analyze
necessary and sufficient entropy of the key of such PQC. We also explicitly
construct PQCs achieving this bound. Another interesting result contained in
Section 7 is that any PQC encrypting given set P of two linearly independent
states encrypts also any two-dimensional set P′ parallel to P and lying in the
plane spanned by P and 121 .
We conclude our paper in Section 8 by few comments on possible general-
izations of the described techniques to systems of higher dimension.
2 Private quantum channel
The private quantum channel [1] is a general framework designed to perfectly
encrypt an arbitrary quantum system using a classical key.
Definition 2.1. Let P ⊆ S(H1,...,n) be a set of n-qubit states2, Eˆ = {(pi, Ui)}i
be a superoperator, where each Ui is a unitary operator on H1,...,m, n ≤ m,
pi ≥ 1 and
∑
i pi = 1. Let ρanc be an (m − n) qubit density matrix and ρ(0)
be an m-qubit density matrix. Then [P, Eˆ, ρanc, ρ
(0)] is a private quantum
1According to time, space or communication complexity.
2To make the definition easier we work with qubits. To obtain an equivalent definition for
arbitrary quantum systems A it suffices to replace H1,...,n by HA and Hn+1,...,m by Hanc.
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Figure 1: Encryption using PQC.
channel (PQC) if and only if for all ρ ∈ P it holds that
Eˆ(ρ⊗ ρanc) =
∑
i
piUi(ρ⊗ ρanc)U †i = ρ(0). (1)
The definition of the private quantum channel establishes the following cryp-
tosystem. Alice wants to establish a communication (quantum) channel with
Bob with the property that any state ρ ∈ P will be transmitted securely. The
security in this case means that Eve gets no advantage (information) by inter-
cepting the transmitted message.
The encryption of the plaintext is done in the way that one operator, chosen
randomly out of the operators {Ui}i, is applied to the plaintext system. The
operator Ui is chosen with probability pi. The classical key specifies which
of the unitary operators was applied. The unitary operators Ui are acting on
H1,...,m, while the state ρ is only n-qubit state. The encryption operation Ui is
performed on the Hilbert space H1,...,m, the plaintext spaceH1,...,n is a subspace
of H1,...,m. The encryption operation is defined on the (possibly) larger space
than the plaintext to allow optional encryption of the plaintext together with an
ancillary system. The encryption operators, therefore, act on a tensor product
of the plaintext Hilbert space H1,...,n and the ancillary Hilbert space Hn+1,...,m,
which is originally factorized (decoupled) from the plaintext. The ancillary
Hilbert space is initially in the state ρanc (see Figure 1).
The security of the scheme can be explained in the following way: Without
knowledge of the key (i.e. without specific knowledge about which of the oper-
ators was used) any initial state ρ ∈ P together with the ancilla appears to be
in the state ρ(0) after the encryption. The state ρ(0) is the same for all ρ ∈ P,
it is independent of the input state. It means that all states from the set P are
physically indistinguishable after the encryption.
A dual point of view of the security is also possible. Let us denote by
C = Eˆ[P] the set of all ciphertexts, i.e. ρ
(c)
i = UiρU
†
i ∈ C for each encryption
operation Ui and plaintext state ρ ∈ P. The encryption key (represented by
the sequence i1, . . . , in) is used also for the decryption. The only difference
in the case of the decryption is that the inverse operations U †i are applied,
i.e. ρ
(c)
i 7→ U †i ρ(c)i Ui = ρ ∈ P. Formally the decryption procedure induces
a transformation Dˆ[ρ] =
∑
i piU
†
i ρUi. It describes the result of a decryption
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of a particular ciphertext without knowledge which key was used to encrypt
it. The probabilities {pi}i are the same as in the case of Eq. (1), because the
probability that the key Ui was used is pi. In general, each encryption operation
Ui defines a different set of ciphertexts Ci. The linear span Ci is just rotated
set of plaintexts P.
From Eq. (1) it follows that the information about the ciphertext contained
in the plaintext is I(ρP : ρC) = 0. However, from the symmetry of the mutual
information it follows that the information about plaintext contained in the
ciphertext is also 0, therefore, the dual equation also holds
Dˆ(ρ) =
∑
i
piU
†
i(ρ)Ui = ρ
(1), (2)
where ρ(1) is fixed for all ciphertext states ρ. The superoperator Dˆ = {(pi, U †i)}i
is not an inverse of the superoperator Eˆ in the standard meaning. It describes
the result of a decryption of a particular ciphertext without knowledge which
key was used to decrypt it.
From the mathematical point of view the encryption transformation Eˆ is
defined as a convex combination of unitary maps. Using the ancilliary system the
encryption can be still defined only in terms of the system under consideration.
Tracing out the ancilla we obtain a map Eˆs with the action defined by Eˆs[ρ] =
TrancEˆ[ρ ⊗ ρanc]. The usage of ancilla results in most general form of the
quantum channel, i.e. Eˆs[ρ] =
∑
i piGˆi[ρ] with Gˆi[ρ] = Tranc[Uiρ ⊗ ρancU †i].
However, for the decryption the ancilliary system is necessary. In this paper
we will analyze PQC without additional ancillas, so the encryption is formally
a convex combination of unitary transformations. It means the encryption is
described by a unital completely positive map, i.e. it preserves the total mixture
1
21 .
Finally, we will introduce one definition and one theorem, which will be used
through this paper.
Definition 2.2. Let P = {ρi|i ∈ I}, where I is an index set. We define the set
P as
P =
{
ρ =
∑
i∈I
λiρi
∣∣∣∣∣ρi ∈ P, λi ∈ R,
∑
i∈I
λi = 1
}
. (3)
Especially in the case when P = {ρ1, ρ2} the set P contains all operators of the
form λρ1 + (1− λ)ρ2.
From now on we will denote the maximally mixed state3 in P as ρ.
Theorem 2.3. Let [P, Eˆ, ρ(0)] be a PQC. Then Eˆ(ρ) = ρ(0) for any operator ρ ∈
P. Note that we are interested only in operators ρ with nonnegative eigenvalues,
since the operators with negative eigenvalue(s) are not valid quantum states.
Proof. The proof follows from the linearity of Eˆ.
3I.e. the state nearest to the maximally mixed state 1
2
1 according to the trace distance.
It is also the nearest state in the Bloch ball.
4
3 Achievable states ρ(0)
In this section we will derive several results on PQC on a single qubit. Our first
question is ’What are the possible states ρ(0) given a specific set P?’. In [1] it
was proved that the only possible candidate for the state ρ(0) is 121 , whenever
1
21
can be expressed as a convex combination of states from P. We will generalize
this result for any set P to calculate the minimal entropy of the key necessary
and sufficient to encrypt a specific set P.
All information about the action of Eˆ we have is its behaviour on the set of
plaintexts P. Each element of this set is transformed into the fixed state ρ(0).
This determines the channel Eˆ completely, or incompletely depending on the set
P. However, in the case of incomplete specifications the choice of the channel Eˆ
has no impact on the security. Under the action of the channel Eˆ each operator
ρ ∈ P is transformed into ρ(0). This follows directly from the linearity of the
transformation Eˆ.
Let us assume a PQC given by operators {(pi, Ui)}i with some ρ(0). By
applying the unitary transformations U ′i = V Ui (V is unitary) we obtain that∑
i piU
′
iρU
′†
i =
∑
i piV UiρU
†
i V
† = V ρ(0)V † = ρ′(0) is fixed for all plaintext
states. It follows that the unitarily transformed PQC is again a PQC with
unitarily transformed average output state. Moreover, a convex combination of
two PQC channels Eˆ1, Eˆ2 for the given set P is again a PQC channel for P. In
particular, Eˆ = π1Eˆ1+π2Eˆ2 is PQC with ρ
(0) = π1ρ
(0)
1 +π2ρ
(0)
2 , i.e. Eˆ[ρ] = ρ
(0)
for all ρ ∈ P. Thus, for a given set of plaintexts P the set of all possible private
quantum channels is convex. The set of achievable states is convex as well. It
is formed by orbits of states under the action of the whole unitary group.
For any TCP map Eˆ the following inequality holds
D(ρ, σ) ≥ D(Eˆ(ρ), Eˆ(σ)) (4)
for the distance measure D(ρ, σ) = Tr|ρ− σ| on mixed states, i.e. two quantum
states ρ, σ cannot become more distinguishable after applying a TCP trans-
formation. We have already mentioned that we consider that the encryption
superoperator Eˆ is unital (we do not consider the ancilla here) and therefore
from Eq. (4) we have
D
(
ρ,
1
2
1
)
≥ D
(
ρ(0),
1
2
1
)
, (5)
where ρ ∈ P is any state in the set P and ρ(0) = Eˆ(ρ) is fixed for all states
ρ ∈ P. We use the fact that for unital maps Eˆ[ 121 ] = 121 . Especially this
equation holds for the state ρ, which is the most mixed density operator in P
(the nearest point to 121 in the Bloch ball).
Therefore the condition is that given the set of plaintext states P any achiev-
able state ρ(0) fulfills the condition
D
(
ρ,
1
2
1
)
≥ D
(
ρ(0),
1
2
1
)
. (6)
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As a consequence, we obtain the result of [1] that the state ρ(0) = 121 whenever
1
21 is contained in the convex span of the set P.
Provided that the most mixed state ρ in P is not 121 , the state ρ
(0) must
have the same or a smaller distance from 121 than ρ. This is the necessary
condition each candidate to the state ρ(0) must obey. In this sense the set of
potential candidates ρ(0) forms a ball within the Bloch ball, with the center in
1
21 and the radius given by the distance of ρ and
1
21 . Let us denote this ball
(set of allowed states) by b. This condition is necessary, it remains to verify
whether it is also sufficient, i.e. whether for a given P and ∀ ρ(0) ∈ b there
exists a suitable TCP superoperator Eˆρ(0) , or equivalently whether the set of all
achievable states coincides with those allowed by inequality (6).
In what follows we will analyze the achievability of ρ(0). Let us first consider
two trivial cases. When P has only a single member, then there is nothing
to encrypt. If the set P contains at least four linearly independent members,
then P already spans the whole Bloch ball and 121 ∈ P. It follows that the
PQC maps all states to 121 , so the set of achievable states contains only single
element. In subsequent sections we will analyze the remaining two cases: i) set
P is two-dimensional, and ii) set P is three-dimensional.
In Sections 4–6 we will adopt analytical approach to prove that for all states
ρ(0) ∈ b given a set of plaintext states P there exists a PQC sending the set P
to ρ(0). In Section 7 we will analyze concrete PQC realizations as well as the
minimal entropy of the key for a given set P and ρ(0). We will show an easily
understandable geometrical method how to construct PQCs for encryption of
the given set of plaintexts.
4 General remarks
In our analysis we will exploit the geometric picture of the Bloch ball (see
Appendix). In both cases we will define specific representatives of the set of
plaintexts P. We will choose the basis of the state space as four operators ξj
represented by mutually orthogonal Bloch vectors ~vj . In particular, we will
rotate the coordinate system (this rotation is just unitary change of the basis
operators) to work with not necessarily positive, but trace-one operators
ξx =
1
2 (1 + αSx) ↔ ~vx = (α, 0, 0)
ξy =
1
2 (1 + βSy) ↔ ~vy = (0, β, 0)
ξz =
1
2 (1 + Sz) ↔ ~vz = (0, 0, 1)
ξ0 =
1
21 ↔ ~v0 = (0, 0, 0)
(7)
The S-basis is just a suitably rotated σ-basis (basis consisting of Pauli opera-
tors), i.e. Sj = UσjU
† for some unitary U .
This new operator basis shares all the properties of the original Pauli basis.
In fact, the operators Sx, Sy, Sz specify only a rotated Cartesian coordinate
system. Each private quantum channel Eˆ induces a contraction of the given
set P into the state ρ(0). Our first aim is to explicitly specify the maximally
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mixed state in ρ ∈ P. The second goal will be to show the achievability of
this state, i.e. the construction of the PQC that transforms the whole set of
plaintexts states into the state ρ(0) having the same mixedness (i.e. distance
from 121 ) as ρ. In particular, ρ
(0) = V ρV † (V is unitary). Let us denote by s
the mixedness of ρ. Then the PQC Eˆρ(0) acts (in a suitably chosen basis) as
follows: Eˆρ(0) [ξj ] = ρ
(0) = 12 (1 + s · Sz) for all ξj ∈ P. Its action on the linear
complement of P must be defined in a way that the whole transformation is
TCP. The existence of such PQC will be proved in subsequent sections.
5 Two states
Given two linearly independent states P = {ρ1, ρ2} the set P defines a line
crossing the Bloch sphere in two pure states, e.g. |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉. The mixedness of
ρλ = λρ1 + (1− λ)ρ2 (i.e. the distance from the total mixture) is characterized
by the length of the corresponding Bloch vector ~rλ. In particular, |~rλ|2 =
λ2|~r1|2+(1−λ)2|~r2|2+2λ(1−λ)~r1 ·~r2 can be easily minimized (with respect to
λ) providing that we use two pure states |ψj〉 ↔ ~rj . In this case |~r1| = |~r2| = 1
and ~r1 · ~r2 = |~r1| · |~r2| cos θ with θ ∈ [0, π] being an angle between the vectors.
The minimum we obtain by calculating the equation
d
dλ
[λ2 + (1− λ)2 − 2λ(1− λ) cos θ] = 2(2λ− 1)(1− cos θ) = 0 (8)
The minimum is achieved for λ = 1/2, i.e. for the equal mixture of two pure
states from P and reads |~rmin| =
√
1
2 (1 + cos θ). For general (nonpure) states
ρ1 ↔ ~r1 and ρ2 ↔ ~r2 the state ρλ = λρ1 +(1−λ)ρ2 is maximally mixed for the
value λ = (|~r2|2 − ~r1 · ~r2)/|~r1 − ~r2|2.
Let us assume that the state |ψ1〉 corresponds to the North Pole of the Bloch
ball and the y coordinate of |ψ2〉 vanishes, i.e. we choose the operator basis
Sx, Sy, Sz such that |ψ1〉〈ψ1| = 12 (1+Sz) and |ψ2〉〈ψ2| = 12 (1+sin θSx+cos θSz).
In other words, the state |ψ2〉 is represented by the vector ~r2 = (sin θ, 0, cos θ).
The norm of the vector ~rλ is minimal for λmin = 1/2, i.e. ~rmin = (
1
2 sin θ, 0,
1
2 (1+
cos θ)) with norm |~rmin| =
√
1
2 (1 + cos θ).
The possible quantum private channels form a set
Eˆ =


1 0 0 0
0 12 (1− cos θ) a 12 sin θ
0 0 b 0
0 12 sin θ c
1
2 (1 + cos θ)

 (9)
and the complete positivity with respect to parameters a, b and c must be
verified. Our aim is to find at least one valid TCP transformation. Therefore,
let us consider that only the parameter b is nonvanishing4 (i.e. we set a = c = 0).
4We will show that even in this particular case there exists a completely positive superop-
erator.
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In this case the matrix is symmetric, so the singular values coincide with the
eigenvalues that read
{λ1, λ2, λ3} = {1, b, 0}. (10)
The complete positivity constraint [13] requires the validity of the following
inequalities
1 + λ1 − λ2 − λ3 ≥ 0 ⇒ b ≤ 2 (11)
1− λ1 + λ2 − λ3 ≥ 0 ⇒ b ≥ 0 (12)
1− λ1 − λ2 + λ3 ≥ 0 ⇒ b ≤ 0 (13)
1 + λ1 + λ2 + λ3 ≥ 0 ⇒ b ≥ −2. (14)
It turns out that the only possibility to satisfy these conditions is that the value
of b must set to zero, i.e. b = 0. As a result, we get that the channel Eˆ with
b = 0 is for sure completely positive for all values of cos θ. Consequently, for
two linearly independent states the derived bound on the choice of the state
ρ(0) is achievable. The achievability of the states inside the ball b we obtain
from the fact that the set of PQCs encrypting given set P is convex as well as
the set of all achievable states, see Section 3. Later we will specify the unitary
transformations forming the private quantum channel explicitly.
6 Three linearly independent states
In case the set P = {ρ1, ρ2, ρ3} contains precisely three linearly independent
states, the set P forms a plane and valid quantum states from this plane (the
intersection with the Bloch ball) form a circle c. Since all points of the ball b,
containing all possible candidates for the state ρ(0), have the distance from 121
the same or smaller than the most mixed state from c, it follows that the circle
c touches the ball b precisely in the middle of the circle c. Moreover, this point
ρ = ρ(0) is the most mixed state from c.
To solve the general case explicitely, we will exploit the tools of analytic
geometry. A plane determined by three points A = ~r1, B = ~r2, C = ~r3 reads
ax+ by + cz + d = 0, where
d = det(~r1 ~r2 ~r3) (15)
a = det(~1 ~r2 ~r3) (16)
b = det(~r1 ~1 ~r3) (17)
c = det(~r1 ~r2 ~1). (18)
The symbol ~1 = (1, 1, 1)T denotes a column vector. The distance from the origin
of the coordinate system (the total mixture) equals to
s =
|d|√
a2 + b2 + c2
. (19)
This number coincides (if s ≤ 1) with the distance between the maximally mixed
state ρ ∈ P and the total mixture. It follows that we can use directly the given
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set of plaintext states {ρ1, ρ2, ρ3} as the basis. However, for our purposes it will
be useful to choose operators ξ1, ξ2, ξ3 ∈ P of the form given in Eq. (7). Let us
assume that the set P does not contain the total mixture. In this case
a = β b = α c = d = αβ (20)
and
s = |~s| = |αβ|√
α2β2 + β2 + α2
. (21)
The question is, whether the transformations ξj 7→ ρ(0) = 12 (1 + s · Sz) = Eˆ[ξj ]
is completely positive, or not. Due to the unitality of the PQC channels, the
transformation Eˆ is completely specified as
Eˆ =


1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 s/α s/β s

 . (22)
Our task is only to verify the condition of complete positivity. The singular
values of Eˆ reads {λ1, λ2, λ3} = {0, 0, s
√
1 + 1
α2
+ 1
β2
}. It follows that the map
is completely positive if and only if 0 ≤ 1−s
√
1 + 1
α2
+ 1
β2
. Inserting the derived
result for the value of s into this complete positivity constraint, we find that it
is always satisfied, because
0 ≤ 1−s
√
1 +
1
α2
+
1
β2
= 1− |βα|√
β2 + α2 + β2α2
√
β2α2 + α2 + β2
β2α2
= 1−1 = 0.
(23)
As a result we obtain that it is always possible to define private quantum
channel so that the norm bound is saturated and the state ρ(0) = ρ is achievable.
Let us note that the value of s is always less than 1, which is in agreement with
the fact that ρ(0) is a quantum state (it belongs to the Bloch ball). The fact
that for a given set of states P it is always possible to find a unital channel Eˆ
such that ∀ ρ ∈ P : Eˆ(ρ) = ρ(0), where ρ(0) is the closest state to the total
mixture belonging to the linear span of the set P, is interesting per se.
The case when ρ(0) lies inside (not on the surface) the ball b we obtain again
from the convexity of the set of private quantum channels as discussed in Section
3.
7 Realizations of PQC and entropy of the key
So far, we studied the existence of PQC with states ρ(0) for a given set of
plaintexts P. Next we will analyze the optimal realizations of these private
quantum channels, i.e. we will ask the question: how many classical bits one
needs to design the PQC. These classical bits represent the key that must
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be shared between sender and receiver to perfectly encrypt/decrypt the quan-
tum states from plaintext. The efficiency of PQC is quantified by the entropy
(H(p) = −∑j pj log2 pj) of the probability distribution of unitary transforma-
tions that specify the length of the shared classical key. It is known [1] that the
ideal realization of PQC for general qubit states requires two bits. It is realized
by arbitrary collection of four unitary transformations {Uk}k satisfying the fol-
lowing orthogonality condition Tr(U †jUk) = 2δjk. Each of these transformations
is applied with the same probability p = 1/4, i.e. H(p) = 2.
Each private quantum channel Eˆ is a convex combination of unitary trans-
formations. Our task is to find a representation for arbitrary PQC, which is op-
timal. The action channel Eˆ can be written in the form Eˆ[ρ] = UΦ
Eˆ
[V ρV †]U †,
where U, V are unitary transformations. For qubit unital channels the induced
transformation Φ
Eˆ
is diagonal, i.e. Φ
Eˆ
= diag{1, λ1, λ2, λ3}. It turns out that
these transformations are of a simple form and can be written as convex com-
bination of four Pauli transformations
Φ
Eˆ
[ρ] = p0ρ+ pxσxρσx + pyσyρσy + pzσzρσz (24)
Consequently, the original transformation Eˆ is realized by four unitary trans-
formations Wj = UσjV , i.e. Eˆ[ρ] =
∑
j pjWjρW
†
j . Since the probabilities do
not change, the PQCs Eˆ and Φ
Eˆ
can be realized with the same entropy. In fact,
this holds in general: two unitarily equivalent PQCs can be always realized with
the same efficiency, i.e. with the classical keys of the same entropy. Thus, it
is sufficient to analyze the optimality of the realization of Pauli channels Φ
Eˆ
.
Finding the singular values corresponding to Eˆ we obtain the diagonal elements
λ1, λ2, λ3 of ΦEˆ. The probabilities pj are related to these values λk via the
following equations
px =
1
4 (1 + λ1 − λ2 − λ3)
py =
1
4 (1− λ1 + λ2 − λ3)
pz =
1
4 (1− λ1 − λ2 + λ3)
p0 = 1− px − py − pz
(25)
The entropy rate of the given PQC H(Eˆ) = H(p), p = {pj}j, is given
by the entropy of the distribution p. Let ρ =
∑
j pj |ψj〉〈ψj |, where {|ψj〉}j
is a set of not necessarily orthogonal quantum states. It follows that S(ρ) =
S(
∑
j pj |ψj〉〈ψj |) ≤ H(p) and the inequality is saturated if and only if {|ψj〉}j
are mutually orthogonal. Let us consider any pure plaintext state |ψ〉 and let
|ψj〉 = Uj |ψ〉. It is clear that
S(Eˆ(|ψ〉〈ψ|)) = S(ρ) = S
(
ρ(0)
)
≤ H(p). (26)
Therefore the entropy of the encryption operation can always be bounded from
below by the entropy of ρ(0) as long as P contains at least one pure state.
This always holds in the case of qubit, however, not in general for systems of
larger dimension. In example in the case of two qubits we can define the set
10
P = {1/41 , 1/2(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|)}. It is clear that P contains no pure state,
it is encrypted by the superoperator
{(1/2, 1 ), (1/2, 1 ⊗ σx)} (27)
and ρ(0) = 141 .
The limit (26) is saturated only if the encoding operators Uj generate mu-
tually orthogonal (noncommuting) states (ciphertexts) for each given plaintext.
In particular, if we consider a PQC for all possible states of a qubit, this limit
can be achieved only (up to unitary equivalence) by encoding with the identity
and the universal NOT operation. However, this map is not completely positive,
and therefore unphysical [7].
Next we shall study the realization of PQC when the set of plaintexts is
two-dimensional and three-dimensional, respectively, and the state ρ(0) is the
maximally mixed one from the set P. For two-dimensional set of plaintexts the
induced transformation is Φ
Eˆ
= diag{1, 0, 0, 1}, i.e. λ1 = λ2 = 0 and λ3 = 1. It
follows that
Φ
Eˆ
[ρ] =
1
2
ρ+
1
2
σzρσz (28)
and one bit is sufficient for encoding.
One can specify the precise form of unitary transformations, but the explicit
calculation is quite lengthy. Instead, we will use the geometric picture of Bloch
sphere to guess the unitaries.
Two states
Let us suppose that the set P = {ρ1, ρ2} has only two (linearly independent)
states. By Theorem 2.3 it also encrypts any state on the line segment l ⊆ P
defined by the points corresponding to the states ρ1 and ρ2 in the Bloch ball.
Let us choose the state ρ(0) as the point where the line segment l touches the
ball5 b (see fig. 2), i.e. ρ(0) = ρ. It is clear that this point is in the center of the
line segment l, since the extremal points of this line segment are on the surface
of the Bloch ball.
We will design a specific superoperator Eˆ, which encrypts this line segment
to the state ρ(0). This superoperator can be realized using two unitary operators
with uniform distribution,
Eˆ(ρ) =
1
2
1 ρ1 +
1
2
UρU †, (29)
where U is the unitary operation, which realizes the rotation of the Bloch ball by
180 degrees around the axis intersecting points ρ(0) and 121 . It is easy to see that
such a superoperator takes any state ρ from l to a convex combination of the
original state ρ and the state which lies on the line l in the same distance from
5Of possible candidates to the state ρ(0).
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Figure 2: Encrypting line segment l.
ρ(0), but on the opposite half line (starting in the point ρ(0)). The consequence
is that the convex combination
1
2
ρ+
1
2
UρU † = ρ(0). (30)
The way to achieve any other point lying on the surface of the ball b is straight-
forward. For any such point ρ′(0) there exists a two dimensional rotation
Rρ(0),ρ′(0) , which rotates the point ρ
(0) to the point ρ′(0). This rotation is real-
ized by some unitary operation Uρ(0),ρ′(0) on the density operators. Therefore,
the superoperator encrypting the whole line segment l into the point ρ′(0) is
Eˆ(ρ) =
1
2
Uρ(0),ρ′(0)1 ρ1U
†
ρ(0),ρ′(0) +
1
2
Uρ(0),ρ′(0)UρU
†U †ρ(0),ρ′(0) . (31)
This superoperator has again Kraus decomposition with only two unitary op-
erators, and therefore only a single bit of key is needed. The method how to
achieve any ρ′(0) ∈ b (not only on the surface) is based on the method of en-
cryption of three linearly independent states and will be discussed later in this
section.
In this way we have demonstrated that one bit of key is sufficient to encrypt
set P containing two linearly independent states. It remains to verify whether
one bit is also necessary. There might e.g. exist some encryption operation
{(p1, U1), (p2, U2)}, p1 + p2 = 1, p1 6= p2 encrypting the set P. Clearly the
entropy of the key of such an operation is smaller than one. We will prove that
one bit is necessary by showing that any encryption superoperator Eˆ encrypting
a line l encrypts also the line l′, which is parallel to l and intersects 121 . Then the
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Figure 3: Encryption of l encrypts also l′.
derived inequality (26) implies that one bit is indeed necessary, since S(121 ) = 1.
Also, Eˆ can be used to encrypt a classical bit ({|0〉, |1〉}) and this result is in
accordance with [26].
Let us denote ρ1 and ρ2 the extremal points of the line segment l (lying on
the surface of the Bloch ball, see figure 3) and ρ′1 and ρ
′
2 the extremal points
of the line segment l′. Let us express each of the points ρ′1 and ρ
′
2 as a linear
combination of the points ρ1, ρ2 and
1
21 . It is easy to see that the coordinates
of the points satisfy
ρ′1 = xρ1 + yρ2 + z
1
2
1 ⇔ ρ′2 = yρ1 + xρ2 + z
1
2
1 . (32)
This relation holds for extremal points of any line segment parallel to l and
lying in the plane spanned by l and 121 . Let Eˆ encrypts l to some state ρ
(0).
Then from linearity and unitality of Eˆ we obtain
Eˆ(ρ′1) = xEˆ(ρ1) + yEˆ(ρ2) + z
1
2
1 = yEˆ(ρ1) + xEˆ(ρ2) + z
1
2
1 = Eˆ(ρ′2) (33)
since Eˆ(ρ1) = Eˆ(ρ2) = ρ
(0) from assumption that Eˆ encrypts l. It follows that
Eˆ encrypts any line segment parallel to l lying in the plane spanned by l and
1
21 .
From Eq. (33) we can also easily determine the state ρ′(0) = Eˆ(ρ′1), i.e. the
state where Eˆ sends the line segment l′. It is the state ρ(0) shifted towards 121 ,
from the equation
Eˆ(ρ′1) = xEˆ(ρ1) + yEˆ(ρ2) + z
1
2
1 = (x+ y)ρ(0) + z
1
2
1 . (34)
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Figure 4: Encryption of the circle c.
The ratio between (x+ y) and z determines the distance from 121 .
We can also derive an analogical result for PQC encrypting a circle in the
Bloch sphere. In this case the fact that it also encrypts all parallel circles
implies that this PQC establishes an approximative encryption of the whole
Bloch sphere, as defined in [18]. Also, in general, PQC encrypting any set P in
any Hilbert space encrypts also all spaces parallel in the superplane spanned by
P and 1
d
1 . This will be discussed in detail in a separate paper.
Three states
In case the set P contains precisely three linearly independent states ρ1, ρ2, ρ3,
their linear span is a plane and valid quantum states from this plane (the in-
tersection with the Bloch ball) form a circle c (see figure 4). Since all points of
the ball b, containing all possible candidates for the state ρ(0), have the distance
from 121 the same or smaller than the most mixed state from c, it follows that
the circle c touches the ball b precisely in the middle of the circle c. Moreover,
this point ρ = ρ(0) is the most mixed state from c.
Following analogical argumentation as in the case of the two states, we con-
struct the TCP superoperator, which encrypts the whole circle and sends it to
ρ(0). This superoperator is the same as in the case of two states, it is the su-
peroperator (29). The operator U is the rotation around the axis of the circle
c. The saturation of any other point on the surface of the ball b is the same as
in the case of two states, see Eq. (31).
Using this result we may also design a PQC, which encrypts a set P of
two linearly independent states into the arbitrary state ρ(0) inside the ball b
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Figure 5: Encryption of the line l with D(ρ(0), 1/21 ) < D(ρ, 1/21 ).
by using just single bit of key. The ball b is now specified by the given line l
associated with the set P. The state ρ(0) specifies uniquelly a sphere g of the
radius r = D(ρ(0), 121 ), centered in total mixture and containing this state on its
surface. There exists a tangent plane κ to this sphere determined by the original
line l. This plane is generated by three linearly independent states and following
the reasoning of this subsection, it can be encrypted into its maximally mixed
state by PQC with H(Eˆ) = 1. However, the maximally mixed state equals
to the only point in the intersection of the plane with the sphere (see figure
5). This point is unitarily equivalent to ρ(0). It means that the original set P
given by two linearly independent states (forming the line in the plane, l ∈ κ) is
encrypted by the same PQC (up to unitary transformation) into the state ρ(0).
Let us now proceed with the analytic approach to see how large key is re-
quired to encrypt the set P into arbitrary state ρ(0) ∈ b. For three-dimensional
set of plaintexts we have a unique PQC that transforms P into the state
ρ(0). The singular values of the corresponding mapping Eˆ reads {λ1, λ2, λ3} =
{0, 0, s
√
1 + 1
α2
+ 1
β2
}. It follows that
p0 = pz = (1 + s
√
1 + 1
α2
+ 1
β2
)/4
px = py = (1 − s
√
1 + 1
α2
+ 1
β2
)/4
(35)
The parameter s corresponds to the distance between the state ρ(0) and the
total mixture. It is bounded by the inequality s ≤ |αβ|√
α2β2+α2+β2
. Except the
case when this inequality is saturated we need four unitary transformations
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to realize the PQC. For maximal value of s two unitary transformations are
sufficient. Moreover, they are used with equal probabilities. It means that
the limiting case (ρ(0) = ρ) for two-dimensional and three-dimensional set of
plaintexts has the same entropy rates.
If you examine the dependence of the probabilities {pi}i on the parameter
s, then you realize that to encrypt three states a single bit of key is sufficient if
ρ(0) is on the surface of the ball b (see the beginning of this section). However,
as the state ρ(0) is getting closer to 121 , the entropy of the key grows up to two
bits.
The key question is whether the derived bound on entropy of PQC encrypting
the given set of three linearly independent states is also necessary, i.e. whether
it is possible for given P and ρ(0) design a PQC with lower entropy of key
than in the derived example. Let us recall the proof that one bit of key is
necessary to encrypt the set of two linearly independent plaintexts, see Section
5. It immediately follows that one bit is also necessary to encrypt plaintext
containing at least three linearly independent states.
The final step is to prove that also the entropy of the private quantum chan-
nel encrypting three dimensional set P, with D(ρ(0), 121 ) < D(ρ,
1
21 ), realized
using the Pauli channel is minimal. Let us introduce the entropy exchange
Sex(ρA, Eˆ) [22] as the quantity measuring the part of quantum information
which is lost into the environment under the action of the channel Eˆ providing
that the system is initially prepared in the state ρA. Provided that the channel
Eˆ on the system A is realized using unitary operation G on a larger system
AE, where E is the environment, the entropy of exchange is defined as the von
Neumann entropy of the reduced density matrix of the environment after apply-
ing the operation G. It turns out that this entropy is independent of concrete
realization of the superoperator.
In particular, any channel Eˆ has unitary representation Eˆ[ρA] = TrE [G(ρA⊗
|0〉〈0|)G†] =∑j AjρAA†j with G =∑j Aj⊗|j〉〈0|. It is known that the entropy
of the environment state ωE = TrA[G(ρA⊗ |0〉〈0|)G†] =
∑
jk Tr[AjρAA
†
k]|j〉〈k|
does not depend on the particular Kraus representation.
In our case this function is the lower bound of the entropy of the key
H({pk}k), i.e. H({pk}k) ≥ maxρA Sex(ρ, Eˆ). This inequality follows from the
fact that S(ωE) ≤ S(diagB[ωE])6 (definition of von Neumann entropy as mini-
mum of Shannon entropy ovel all measurements) and for PQC channels we have
diagB[ωE ] =
∑
k pkTr[UkρAU
†
k]|k〉〈k|. Using the the trace properties and nor-
malization of ρA we obtain diagB[ωE ] = {pk}k, i.e. S(diagB[ωE]) = H({pk}k).
In what follows we will show that for qubit the inequality is saturated for
decomposition into orthogonal unitaries, i.e. for Pauli channels. From the previ-
ous paragraph it is clear that it is sufficient to show that for some ρ the induced
enviroment state ωE is diagonal. Hence, we have to verify the conditions under
which the identity Tr[UjρU
†
k] = 0 holds for j 6= k. In such case the inequality
is saturated. It is easy to see that by choosing ρ = 121 this is the condition for
6The diagB[ωE ] is the all-zero matrix except for the diagonal elements, which are equal to
diagonal elements of ωE in the basis B.
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orthogonality of transformations Uj and this justifies our statement.
We have shown that for orthogonal decomposition of the channel Eˆ the
entropy of the inequality is saturated, i.e. entropy of the key equals to entropy
exchange and this is indeed the maximal value of entropy exchange. Fortunately,
the entropy exchange does not depend on the particular decomposition and
therefore the entropy of the key cannot be lower for another decompositions.
It turns out that for qubits any unital channel can be written as a convex
combination of orthogonal unitaries. However, for larger systems this is not the
case in general. Consequently, the qubit PQC channel with minimal entropy of
the key is the one with orthogonal encoding operations, i.e. the corresponding
Pauli channel Φ
Eˆ
.
The necessary and sufficient entropy of the key is 1 when ρ(0) = ρ and it
grows up to 2 bits as the state ρ(0) approaches 121 . Therefore, it is natural to
express the entropy as a function of the parameter
r =
D(ρ(0), 1/21 )
D(ρ, 1/21 )
, (36)
where the radius of the Bloch ball is 1.
Let us use the parametrization of states ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 ∈ P introduced in the
Eq. (7) and put s = D(ρ(0), 1/21 ) and p = D(ρ, 1/21 ) = |αβ|/
√
1 + α2 + β2.
Comparing it with the Eq. (35) we obtain that the probabilites reads p0 = pz =
1
4 (1 + r) and px = py =
1
4 (1 − r), where we used the relation r = s/p. The
evaluation of the entropy for this realization of PQC channel leads us to formula
H({pj}j) = −
∑
j
pj log2 pj = 2−
1
2
[(1 + r) log2(1 + r) + (1 − r) log2(1− r)] ,
(37)
where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. It is easy to see that 1 ≤ H({pj}j) ≤ 2. The graph of the
functionH({pj}j) depending on the variable r is on the Figure 6. Unfortunately,
as we see from the graph, the entropy grows very fast as r goes to 0. In example
for r = 1/2 the entropy is already H({pj}j) ≈ 1.81128.
8 Conclusion
All single-qubit private quantum channels
In this paragraph we will answer the following question: which unital maps
constitute a PQC? We have shown that it is sufficient to consider only Pauli
channels, i.e. the maps Φ
Eˆ
= diag{1, λ1, λ2, λ3}. Nontrivial private quan-
tum channels are characterized by the property, that at least two pure states
|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 are mapped into the same state ρ(0). In the Bloch sphere parametriza-
tion (~r = (rx, ry, rz)) this means that ~r1 7→ ~r′1 = ~s and ~r2 7→ ~r′2 = ~s. Using these
relations and explicit form of the Pauli channel we come to the following “PQC”
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conditions 0 = ~r′1−~r′2, i.e. λj(r1j − r2j) = 0 for all components j = x, y, z. This
equality is satisfied only if λj = 0 for some j, or r1j = r2j . Consider the case
when none of the λs vanishes, i.e. λ1λ2λ3 6= 0. It follows that in order to fulfill
the PQC conditions r1j = r2j for every j. But it means that the states are the
same. Therefore, at least one of the parameters λj must vanish. Otherwise the
transformation does not correspond to private quantum channel. The complete
positivity condition restricts the possible values of λ1, λ2 (we put λ3 = 0) so that
the inequality |λ1 ± λ2| ≤ 1 characterize all the possible qubit private quantum
channels.
Multi-qubit generalization
This result can be generalized for a specific class of multi-qubit states. In each
of the n qubits we choose a set of plaintexts Pk in the corresponding Bloch ball.
Each of the qubits can be encoded by PQC Eˆk : Pk 7→ ρ(0)k . Following the single
qubit results, we design a PQC on each of the qubits, which encrypts any state
of the form ∑
i
µiρ
(i)
1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ(i)n , (38)
where ∀i : µi ∈ R,
∑
i µi = 1 and ∀i, k : ρ(i)k ∈ Pk. Let us denote the set of such
states by P. Note note that this set contains entangled states as well, because
not only convex combinations of factorized states are allowed. The values of
µi are arbitrary. Consider for instance two qubits. Using PQC encryption for
P = S(H) on each qubit enables us to encrypt each two-qubit (even entangled)
quantum state.
Other implications
In this paper we derived the restriction that the state ρ(0) of the private quantum
channel can be any state which has the distance from the maximally mixed state
1
21 the same or smaller than the state ρ, where ρ denotes the most mixed state
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in the linear span of P. We showed that any of these states can be achieved in
the case of the qubit and therefore this condition is also sufficient.
Further, we demonstrated that it is enough to use a single bit of key to
encrypt the set P, which is spanned by two linearly independent states, and
that any state of the previously described candidates to the state ρ(0) can be
achieved. We derived the same result for the set P containing three linearly
independent states, but with the restriction that a single bit of the key suffices
provided that the state ρ(0) has the same distance from 1/21 as the state ρ. As
the distance of the state ρ(0) to 121 approaches 0, the necessary and sufficient
entropy of the key approaches 2.
As a special consequence of our derivation we obtain the result of [1] that
the state ρ(0) = 121 when
1
21 is in the convex span of P and two bits of the
key are needed to encrypt a qubit. Another special consequence of the above
derivations is the result of [1] that to encrypt real combinations of two orthogonal
basis states it is necessary and sufficient to use a single bit of key. These real
combinations form a circle on the surface of the Bloch ball with center coinciding
with the center of the Bloch ball.
Moreover, from the discussion in Section 6 it follows that the impossibility
of universal not operation on qubit [7, 8] can be derived from the fact that one
bit of the key is not sufficient to encrypt a qubit.
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A Bloch sphere and qubit channels
Qubit (two-dimensional quantum system) provides us a very simple and illustra-
tive picture of the state space. Any state can be expressed as a linear combina-
tion of the operators {1 , σx, σy, σz}. In particular, each operator ρ = 12 (1 +~r ·~σ)
has a unit trace and if |~r| ≤ 1, then it is also positive. Consequently, the state
space forms a ball with the unit radius. The equivalence ρ ↔ ~r is called Bloch
sphere representation (see for instance Refs. [22, 24]). From the orthogonality
relation Trσkσl = 2δkl the parameters of state are given by a simple formula
~r = Trρ~σ, i.e. as the mean values of the hermitian operators (measurements)
σx, σy, σz .
Let us describe the relation between the density operators S(H) (three-
parametric subset) embedded in four-dimensional space of Hermitian operators
and the Bloch sphere contained in three-dimensional space. Let us denote by
ρj (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) the basis of this space corresponding to four density operators.
The vectors ~rj represents the associated points in the Bloch sphere (in three
dimensional real vector space). Only trace-preserving linear combinations, i.e.
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ρ =
∑
j ajρj with
∑
j aj = 1 for real aj , can be understand as linear combi-
nations of the vectors within the Bloch sphere picture, i.e. ~r =
∑
j aj~rj . In
fact, Bloch sphere is situated in the three-dimensional space of Hermitian oper-
ators with unit trace, but only special linear combinations (
∑
j aj = 1) of Bloch
vectors has its counterparts in the original space of Hermitian operators.
The structure of qubit channels is known mainly due to work of Ruskai et al.
[20, 25]. Let us now briefly present a corresponding geometrical picture. From
the mathematical point of view [22, 24] the channels are described by linear
trace-preserving completely positive maps Eˆ defined on the set of operators.
The complete positivity is guaranteed if the operator Ω
Eˆ
= (Eˆ ⊗ 1 )P+ is a
valid quantum state7. Any qubit channel Eˆ can be illustrated as an affine
transformation of the Bloch vector ~r, i.e. ~r 7→ ~r′ = T~r+~t, where T is a real 3x3
matrix and ~t is a translation. This form guarantees that the transformation Eˆ
is hermitian and trace preserving, but the complete positivity conditions define
(nontrivial) constraints on possible values of parameters. In fact, the set of all
completely positive trace-preserving maps forms a specific convex subset of all
affine transformations.
Any matrix T can be written in the so-called singular value decomposition,
i.e. T = RUDRV with RU , RV corresponding to orthogonal rotations and D =
diag{λ1, λ2, λ3} being diagonal with λk the singular values of T . This means
that any map Eˆ is a member of less-parametric family of maps of the “diagonal
form” Φ
Eˆ
. In particular Eˆ[ρ] = UΦ
Eˆ
[V ρV †]U † with U, V unitary operators.
The reduction of parameters is very helpful, and most of the properties (also
complete positivity) of Eˆ is reflected by the properties of Φ
Eˆ
. The map Eˆ is
completely positive only if Φ
Eˆ
is. Let us note that Φ
Eˆ
is determined not only
by the matrix D, but also by a new translation vector ~τ = RU~t, i.e. under the
action of the map Φ
Eˆ
the Bloch sphere transforms as follows rj 7→ r′j = λjrj+τj .
A special type of completely positive maps are the unital ones, i.e. those
for which the total mixture (center of the Bloch sphere) is preserved. For these
channels the translation term vanishes, ~t = ~τ = ~0, and the Bloch sphere is
“shrinked” without shifting its center. In this case the analysis of all possible
channels is quite simple, because the induced map Φ
Eˆ
is uniquely specified only
by three real parameters. Positivity of the transformation Φ
Eˆ
corresponds to
conditions |λk| ≤ 1, i.e. all points lying inside a cube. The conditions of com-
plete positivity [20, 25] demands the validity of the following four inequalities
|λ1 ± λ2| ≤ |1 ± λ3|. This specifies the tetrahedron lying inside a cube of all
positive unital maps with extremal points being four unitary transformations
1 , σx, σy , σz.
It follows that each unital map is unitarily equivalent to the map of the form
Φ
Eˆ
= diag{1, λ1, λ2, λ3}. The set of all unital channels is convex. Obviously
the unitary channels are extremal points of this set. Let us consider a Pauli
channel Pˆ[ρ] =
∑
k pkσkρσk, i.e. a general convex combination of four Pauli
unitary transformations. Rewriting this action in the Bloch sphere parameters
7P+ is a projection onto maximally entangled state |ψ+〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉).
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we obtain the transformation
Pˆ =


1 0 0 0
0 1− 2(py + pz) 0 0
0 0 1− 2(px + pz) 0
0 0 0 1− 2(px + py)

 . (39)
As a result we get that unital channels are unitarily equivalent to Pauli channel.
Consequently, each unital channel Eˆ can be written as a convex combination
of (at least) four unitary channels. The probabilities are determined by the
parameters of the induced map Φ
Eˆ
px =
1
4 (1 + λ1 − λ2 − λ3)
py =
1
4 (1− λ1 + λ2 − λ3)
pz =
1
4 (1− λ1 − λ2 + λ3)
p0 = 1− px − py − pz.
(40)
Unitary channels are rotations of the Bloch sphere. Unital channels are
rotations combined with the deformation so that the output states form an
ellipsoid centered in the total mixture. The values λj define the size of the
ellipsoid along three main axes.
References
[1] A. Ambainis, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, and R. de Wolf. Private quantum chan-
nels. In FOCS 2000, pages 547–553, 2000. quant-ph/0003101.
[2] H. Barnum, C. Cre´peau, D. Gottesman, A. Smith, and A. Tapp. Authen-
tication of quantum messages. In FOCS 2002, 2002. quant-ph/0205128.
[3] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard. Quantum cryptography: public key distri-
bution and coin tossing. In Proceedings of IEEE International Conference
on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India, pages
175–179, 1984.
[4] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Cre´peau, andM.-H. Skubiszewska. Practical
quantum oblivious transfer. In Proceedings of the 11th Annual International
Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, pages 351–366, 1991.
[5] J. Bouda. Encryption of quantum information and quantum cryptographic
protocols. PhD thesis, Faculty of Informatics, Masaryk University, septem-
ber 2004.
[6] P. O. Boykin and V. Roychowdhury. Optimal encryption of quantum bits.
quant-ph/0003059, 2000.
[7] V. Buzˇek, M. Hilery, and R. F. Werner. Optimal manipulations wih qubits:
Universal not gate. Phys. Rev. A, 60:R2626–R2629, 1999.
21
[8] V. Buzˇek, M. Hilery, and R. F. Werner. Universal not gate. J. Mod. Opt.,
47:211–232, 2000.
[9] R. Cleve, D. Gottesman, and H.-K. Lo. How to share a quantum secret.
Phys. Rev. Lett., 85:648–651, 1999. quant-ph/9901025.
[10] C. Cre´peau. Quantum oblivious transfer. J. Mod. Opt., 41(12):2445–2454,
1994.
[11] D. P. DiVincenzo, P. Hayden, and B. M. Terhal. Hiding quantum data.
Found. Phys., 33(11):1629–1647, 2003. quant-ph/0207147.
[12] A. K. Ekert. Quantum cryptography based on bell’s theorem. Phys. Rev.
Lett., 67:661, 1991.
[13] A. Fujiwara and P. Algoet. One-to-one parametrization of quantum chan-
nels. Phys. Rev. A, 59(5):3290–3294, 1999.
[14] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden. Quantum cryptography.
quant-ph/0101098, 2001.
[15] D. Gottesman. On the theory of quantum secret sharing. Phys. Rev. A,
61:042311, 2000. quant-ph/9910067.
[16] D. Gottesman and H.-K. Lo. From quantum cheating to quantum security.
Physics Today, 53(11):22, 2000. quant-ph/0111100.
[17] J. Gruska. Quantum computing. Osborne McGraw-Hill, 1999.
[18] P. Hayden, D. W. Leung, P. W. Shor, and A. Winter. Randomizing quan-
tum states: Constructions and applications. quant-ph/0307104, 2003.
[19] M. Hillery, V. Buzˇek, and A. Berthiaume. Quantum secret sharing. Phys.
Rev. A, 59:1829, 1999. quant-ph/9806063.
[20] C. King and M. B. Ruskai. Minimal entropy of states emerging from noisy
quantum channels. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 47:192–209,
2001.
[21] D. W. Leung. Quantum vernam cipher. Quantum Information and Com-
putation, 2(1):14–34, 2002. quant-ph/0012077.
[22] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang. Quantum Computation and Quantum
Information. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
[23] J. Oppenheim and M. Horodecki. How to reuse a one-time pad and other
notes on authentication, encryption and protection of quantum informa-
tion. quant-ph/0306161, 2003.
[24] J. Preskill. Lecture notes on quantum information processing.
http://www.theory.caltech.edu/people/preskill/ph229/#lecture.
22
[25] M. B. Ruskai, S. Szarek, and E. Werner. An analysis of completely-positive
trace-preserving maps on M2. quant-ph/0101003, 2001.
[26] C. E. Shannon. Communication theory of secrecy systems. Bell System
Technical Journal, 28(4):656–715, 1949.
23
